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of organization 
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Abstract. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) educated economists on 
the notion of entropy laws in economics and ecological process. An 
earlier paper by Kenneth E. Boulding (1962) asked what we might do 
with a measure of organizational entropy, were one ever devised. The 
aim of this paper is to propose the notion of planning horizons as a 
candidate for this role. First, the concept of organizational entropy is 
discussed and defined within the interdependent domain of ecological 
economics. Next, the character and contributions of an entropic 
measure of organization are reviewed, as described in Boulding’s 
work. Third, the concept of planning horizons – and their relation to 
economic cohesion, efficiency and well-being – is introduced to show 
how ‘horizon effects’ (shifts in planning horizons) serve as an ordinal 
entropic measure of organization in dynamic complex settings of 
interdependent effects. Last, the promise of planning horizons as a 
new social research program in ecological economics shall be 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
The defining characteristic of institutional and ecological economics is 
interdependence: everything causally interrelates with no bound to resulting effects. 
Every act ripples out through social and physical space onto all living creatures, 
whether we know it or not. ‘Time, Space, and Nature’ are ‘seamless wholes’ without 
‘joints’ for a ‘carver’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1971, p. 66). The whole System moves in 
concert: dynamic, chaotic, complexly unfolding in patterns seemingly of its own 
making, combining components in new ways selectively understood by us. ‘The new 
biological conception … the organismic epistemology … is a belated recognition of 
the existence of novelty by combination’ that ‘contributes something that is not 
deducible from the properties of the individual components’ (Georgescu-Roegen 
1967, pp. 112 and 62). But complexly interdependent systems – seamless save in our 
scientific conceptions – show where analysis fails in the presence of qualitative 
variation and dialectic emergence. As Georgescu-Roegen (1971, p. 67) noted: ‘…The 
impossibility of defining formally the intuitive continuum is a logical consequence 
of the opposition between the essential property of numbers to be distinctly discrete 
and the characteristic property of the intuitive continuum to consist of dialectically 
overlapping elements leaving no holes.’ How might we encompass such continuity in 
our research? 
 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971, pp. 128-33) offers the Entropy Law as ‘the 
only clear example of an evolutionary law … a proposition that describes an 
ordinal attribute E of a given system … a ‘‘time’s arrow’” of entropic direction. 
The Entropy Law states ‘that the entropy [or disorder] of the universe increases 
as Time flows through the observer’s consciousness.’ Indeed, as Georgescu-
Roegen (1967, p. 93; 1971, p. 194) put it, ‘our whole economic life feeds on low 
entropy’ at the cost of high entropy elsewhere: ‘life speeds up the entropic 
degradation of the whole system.’ His treatment of entropy is about order and 
energy, not about organization. 
 
Kenneth Boulding opens ‘Some Questions on the Measurement and Evaluation 
of Organization,’ taking an organizational view of this entropic measurement 
problem. Defining ‘organization’ as ‘ordered structure’ of ‘roles’ in society, 
Boulding (1962, pp. 131-32) envisions two different processes in the universe, 
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entropy and evolution, where evolution also entails segregation of entropy. He 
adds that a measure of organization would constitute an index of evolution in 
both direction and magnitude, were we to craft such a yardstick. An important 
key to evolution lies in the teaching process, which augments organization and 
knowledge. Consequently, an index of organization would also serve as a metric 
for knowledge and learning success. As Boulding (1962, pp. 135-40) explains, 
economic advance is at essence organizational: it does not yield homogeneous 
growth but is ‘an evolutionary, developmental, and almost embryological 
process.’ He also imputes an ethical aspect to any organizational measure, as 
such enhances ‘goodness.’ The unmet challenge is to reduce ‘large and complex 
constellations of organization’ down to ‘a one-dimensional scalar of ‘‘goodness,’” 
with a ‘price system’ of value weights: ‘the development of a workable measure of 
organization would at least be a first step toward the construction of an ethical 
calculus’ leading ‘toward the solution of many problems, not only in biology and 
in the social sciences, but also in ethics.’ 
 
So Georgescu-Roegen’s entropic concept turns on energy usage and its service to 
purposive human enjoyment. Boulding’s view is more institutional, linked to 
organizational theories of learning and human activity. Yet both are in need of 
a unifying conception of entropic change. The interrelation of planning 
horizons with pricing, growth and efficiency offers a novel look at the entropy 
problem and our need to assess it through an organizational lens. Some of the 
most important dimensions of entropy in our relations appear within a 
horizonal outlook. Starting with interdependence and the challenge of economic 
analysis in a complex systems setting, the Entropy Law – with respect to energy 
and organization – can be interpreted as a horizonal measure of organizational 
‘slack.’ In this way, ‘horizon effects’ shift us on an entropic continuum, 
measurable with respect to improvement in Boulding’s ethical sense. 
 
 
The entropy law with respect to energy and organization 
 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen along with most ecological economists see entropy as 
energy use: production and consumption decrease entropy in our locality, at the 
cost of higher entropy elsewhere. The sole reason we can afford the 
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unsustainable economic consumption patterns seen nowadays is due to a stock of 
exhaustible low entropy, including coal, gas and oil as available energy assets. 
Renewable energy, on the other hand, is sustainable (theoretically), yet these 
options must be exploited in nondestructive ways, so other resources are not 
endangered thereby: expanding hydroelectric power at the expense of salmon 
runs serves as a useful example of conflicting conservation effects. 
 
But Georgescu-Roegen’s stress on energy – although important – does not 
directly address social activity and its organizational limits, beyond some 
mention of factories and diminishing versus increasing returns. He does connect 
the issue of nonlinearity to qualitative adjustments lurking behind the 
quantification of ‘sameness’ in analytical models, saying: ‘We have to recognize 
once and for all that sameness is an internal affair of a single mind’ (Georgescu-
Roegen 1971, p. 75). Thus he sees increasing returns as ‘essentially evolutionary 
… necessarily irreversible and perhaps irrevocable’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1967, p. 
107; 1971, p. 321). He does acknowledge two other measures of evolution in 
biology – “‘complexity of organization’’ and ‘‘degree of control over the 
environment’” – but dismisses both as unsatisfactory as ‘the suggested attributes 
are not ordinally measurable’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1971, p. 128). It may be 
sufficient to note that ‘horizon effects’ circumvent this problem: ‘organizational 
complexity’ in itself need not be progressive (as it could shorten or lengthen 
horizons), while longer horizons allow us more control of environmental forces 
through an understanding thereof. 
 
Boulding’s approach to evolution through teaching and learning as organization 
is closer to a horizonal view, where every action we take creates effects spreading 
outward forever in a totally interdependent domain of complex causal relations. 
The organizational literature relates to incentive design, tying Boulding’s (1956) 
and Simon’s (1981) work on rational limits to ecological economics through 
management theory. A way to think of organizational entropy in this sense is as 
a ‘measure of fit’ of theoretical models to realms of application, by the realism 
and essentiality of their assumptions. For example, as Pylyshyn (1984, p. 251) 
noted:  
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It is my view that there is only one empirical hypothesis responsible for 
the productive success of the entire range of imagery models…: When 
people imagine a scene or an event, what occurs in their minds is, in 
many ways, similar to what happens when they observe the 
corresponding event actually happening.  
 
The realism of our assumptions, by improving the fit of theory and truth, allows 
an extension of planning horizons. 
 
The point is that, as social arrangements become more complex, organizational 
linkages grow in importance for economic advance. Social systems – when unfit 
to requirements – shorten horizons: such is what we see today in the 
contradictions of competition in a new economy of informational 
complementarity as opposed to industrial substitution (Jennings 2008a). The 
shift to informational content from material output is profound for economics, 
as it entails a change of interdependence from substitution to complementarity, 
exemplified by a reversal of the relation of value to scarcity. Information 
economies do not suffer from the same problems as industry; information is 
reproduced ‘at near-to-zero marginal costs. The ‘‘new’’ economy, thus, has entered 
a stage of informational abundance which bears little resemblance to the con-
ventional mainstream economic assumption of scarcity’ (Elsner 2004, p. 1032). 
 
Substitution – derived from materialistic conflicts of interest – does not apply 
among complements in ecology and education; here positive feedbacks are the 
rule and trade-offs seem the exception. Thus, abundance in networks stimulates 
value where rarity undermines worth; the more ubiquitous the connections, the 
higher will be the demand. As Angus Matthew (2001, p. 2 of 7), writing on ‘The 
New Economy,’ put it: 
 
In the networked economy, the more plentiful things become, the more 
valuable they become. … In a networked economy, value is derived from 
plenitude, the concept of abundance. … Abundance is everything. 
Ubiquity drives increasing returns in a networked world. In fact, the 
only factor becoming scarce in a world of abundance is human 
attention. 
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This supplants a correlation of scarcity and dearness with a new inverse relation 
between them in a ‘public goods’ setting: connectivity augments worth in any 
networked economy! Yet economists still see competition as an efficient design 
in the presence of complementarity, while blithely ignoring its lack of 
applicability to this setting. 
 
If models unfit to applications are used to guide decisions, then planning 
horizons shorten due to uncertainty and surprise. ‘…The only raison d’être of 
theory is economy of thought,’ where ‘the choice of relevant facts … is the vital 
problem in economics’ and ‘a ‘‘simple-minded’’ model may … be the more 
enlightening representation of the economic process’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1971, 
pp. 15 and 340-41). This is why essentiality is as important as realism when 
matching assumptions to applications: if models steering our actions do not fit 
the settings in which they are used, inefficiencies – including conflict and 
wasted resources – result. These are not dismissable methodological issues in any 
event: they underlie some serious problems in economics today. 
 
Entropy is disorganization as much as usable energy loss; if economic incentive 
structures are ill-designed to their realms, entropy rises more than expected: 
efficiency is lost. The question is how we express such effects in a simple ordinal 
measure, by distilling ‘large and complex constellations of organization’ into ‘a 
one-dimensional scalar of ‘‘goodness’” through a system of value weights 
(Boulding 1962, p. 140). The matter of how we measure entropic cultural 
attributes of an economy in terms of energy, organization or planning horizons 
seems severely intractable, until the methodological issues surrounding it are 
addressed. Designs must fit to purpose and context; this is where we start to 
make a case for entropy as horizonal in economic society. 
 
 
Toward a horizonal measure of entropy 
 
First we must recognize interdependence: systemic complexity is the centerpoint 
of horizonal theory. Economists see ‘the market’ as an organizational process 
through which all our conflicting wants are reconciled by a system of prices. 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is said to work efficiently in the presence of substitution 
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and rising cost, though all bets are off when increasing returns are introduced to 
this scheme, as they make complementarity ‘far more important’ than 
substitution (Kaldor 1975, p. 348). In this setting, cooperation is the efficient 
solution to economic organization, not competitive fragmentation. The economic 
conundrum of increasing returns and complementarity is that we lack any 
quantitative framework of arithmomorphic constructions suited to this scene, as 
Georgescu-Roegen has shown. Nonlinearity is symptomatic of a dialectic (qua-
litative) variation behind the ‘sameness’ supposed in our models. A different 
economics is needed for increasing returns systems of positive feedback, 
cumulative causation and dialectic emergence of ‘novelty through combination.’ 
This is our primary problem: measuring evolutionary advance or retreat through 
horizonal links. 
 
In one elementary aspect, the entropy of economic communities is the inverse of 
their efficiency: using resources without more regard to their social effects 
stands at the center of ecological economists’ story of ‘full cost’ pricing (Hawken 
1994). Most of us say, ‘if prices are right, then private individual choice will lead 
to efficient outcomes,’ so resources seek their best use (though representation of 
future generations should be included too). When all decisions are 
interdependent across space (social and physical) and through ongoing time – 
moving the ‘seamless Whole’ of our Universe so unpredictably in its spinning 
complexity – any evolutionary understanding appears so intractable as to tempt 
economists into an Age of Denial about increasing returns and their economic 
effects. As Boulding averred, a measure of organizational entropy and evolution 
is crucial in this setting. 
 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971, pp. 213-14) notes the role of boundaries in our process 
analysis: ‘No analytical boundary, no analytical process.’ He adds that ‘a 
boundary must necessarily consist of two distinct analytical components. One 
component sets the process against its ‘‘environment’’ at any point of time. …We 
may refer to this component as the frontier of the process. … The boundary must 
also contain a temporal component, the duration of the process.’ But total 
interdependence suggests such ‘slices’ are imposed by us on the ‘seamless Whole’ 
of the Universe, so on what basis should we do that? How might we set 
the‘frontiers’ of an integral process, and determine ‘duration’? In part, this is an 
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issue of ‘scale’ in ecological economics (Jennings 2008b): the scope of the analysis 
should reflect the scale of ‘essential’ effects within our range of vision, over a 
time that fits their resilience. But these are matters – centrally – of perception, 
not just of fact, in a world where everything ripples outward forever without any 
end to its impact. 
 
This is where planning horizons serve to ‘bound’ awareness and conscience: 
effects spread outward forever, but prior knowledge of them does not. The 
rational limits of human intelligence stand as a ‘boundary’ between anticipation 
and surprise, showing a way to deal with interdependence. With no seams out 
there in the world, the only slices are those we impose: our rational limits seem 
an appropriate choice of frontier for our analyses, with an implicit duration in 
the temporal length of planning perspectives. 
 
Horizons are multidimensional, though; we ground imagined projections – on 
which all decisions are made – upon knowledge of relevant theory, which 
involves selective focus on discretely-asserted ‘essentials.’ Certain contingent 
tracks are projected outward further than others, because of familiarity or 
ranking. The point where reality then departs from prior expectations sets the ex 
post horizon for that decision: this is the role of surprise in defining the actual 
length of horizons, since we may deem our horizons long until we learn they 
were short. For example, psychotics may see themselves with broad ranges of 
vision, when they are really abstracting away from many other confounding 
effects: selective focus is also – at the same time – restrictive blindness. 
 
But this story only encompasses single agents’ horizons; the organizational issues 
stem from the interdependence of planning perspectives in the horizonal realm. 
Planning horizons shift together: if you are in my decision environment, your 
behaviors shape my own; horizon effects are contagious. When you become more 
predictable, lengthening your horizons, I can plan better too: horizons move in 
concert, more often than not, in the most general case. So ‘interhorizonal 
complementarity’ is the rule and not the exception, though ‘interhorizonal 
substitution’ can be imagined as well – such as in jealous reactions to neighbors’ 
success – but these effects select themselves out in any open economy, being 
counterproductive in their rewards. So we can assume, in general, for all agents i 
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= 1,…,n, that dHij*/dHj* > 0. If so, horizonal lengthening creates a local decline 
of entropy, in which choices become more aware and better aligned to each 
other. The integration – therewith efficiency – of economic coordination is 
strengthened by longer planning horizons. Such implies a horizonal index of 




Horizon effects as a measure of ‘goodness’: social welfare 
ramifications 
 
So what has been shown thus far? First, there is a planning horizon (H*) 
inherent in every decision, based on the range of imagined projections on which 
choices are made. But H* is a complex variable: ex ante, it can be seen as an 
‘average’ of all contingent projections, though ex post it is set where anticipation 
is overcome by surprise. The closer the fit of theory to fact – the better aligned 
our assumptions are to the extant truths of their application, in both their 
‘realism’ and the ‘essentiality’ of their selective focus – the longer can our 
horizons stretch for any (given) level of effort. This last is important, as 
Boulding (1962, p. 134) explains, since learning is not just teaching (or 
‘printing’) but ‘inspiration’ as well. The greater our level of faith and confidence 
– in ourselves and those surrounding us – the more time, money, attention and 
energy will be invested in choice, so the broader our range of projection. In this 
sense, social planning horizons serve as a measure of economic cohesion and 
efficiency in an interdependent economy of independent decisions. Socially, 
economic coordination is the whole game, but our models must fit to the facts 
for any assurance of value in outcomes. 
 
Second, ‘horizon effects’ – shifts in planning horizons for individuals – are 
contagious as well: longer horizons infect those of proximal others in nearby 
space. We are role models for each other, and learning is mostly imitation. 
Horizons stretch or retract together in any social group: interhorizonal 
complementarity yields some meaningful lessons for economists’ system designs 
and their welfare ramifications. For those implications, the interrelation of 
planning horizons to pricing and economic advance should be sketched. 
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The barest summary of the relation of pricing decisions to planning horizons 
can be outlined thus: for all prices, dP*/dH < 0 with d2P*/dH2 > 0. The basic idea  
is that P*= M*E*, with dM*/dH < 0 and d2M*/dH2 > 0, and dE*/dH < 0 and 
d2E*/dH2 > 0; so dP*/dH < 0 and d2P*/dH2 > 0 (Margolis 1960, pp. 531-32). On the 
assumption that the proportional growth rate of sales is g*  dlnQ/dt, we can 
also infer that dg*/dH > 0 and d2g*/dH2 < 0. The expression for P* is derived 
thus: formally (in deductive terms), M* ≡ MR=MC at Q* (the maximum profit 
condition), where E* ≡ [ε*/(ε*+1)] with E*>1 because -∞ < ε* < -1 [where demand 
elasticity ε ≡ dlnQ/dlnP ≡ (dQ/Q)/(dP/P) is the percentage response of Q to a one-
percent increase in P]. The basic expression emerges from the definition of MR 
as dR/dQ (where R ≡ PQ) with respect to Q or P, which can be written simply as 
P = MR  [ε /(ε+1)], yielding P* = M*E*, which price is adjusted until actual 
Q* and g* are as expected for a given horizon H* (Jennings 2008a, 2009, 2012). 
Also all cost and demand relations – subjectively held – depend on diverse 
factors mostly unknown to a price-setter: there is no ‘perfect knowledge’ 
assumption of ‘full information’ here. The price-setter does the best she can to 
imagine unexplored options – such as other possible PP* and their likely 
outcomes in Q – but demand and cost curves are not observed; they are projected 
theoretically, and so have epistemological – and not ontological – status (Simon 
1981, p. 103). 
 
But to understand the reaction of prices to horizon effects, we must move beyond 
individuals into a system of interlinked choices. The primary form of 
interdependence subsumed in neoclassical theory is substitution: the aggregation 
of firms into ‘industries,’ the interaction of factory inputs (e.g., Stigler 1951, p. 
140-44 vs. Nelson 1981, pp. 1053-55), and the chary attitude of consumers to each 
other’s well-being amount to a rigid dismissal of common aims for rivalrous 
strife. Factually, it remains open whether conflicts (substitution) or concerts 
(complementarities) of interest dominate human affairs. This is an issue of vital 
concern to social organization. 
 
For any group I of firms, we compare individual with joint profit-maximizing 
prices to form a measure of net interdependence (SI) with respect to each 
member. This supplies economists with a broader rule of composition (Krupp 
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1963) than the ‘industry’ concept, within a Chamberlinian frame (Chamberlin 
1933 and 1957; Jennings 1968). Our measure of interdependence (SI) can also be 
seen as a Hicks-Kaldor (1939) compensation process, in which substitutes for a 
given product j would pay to raise Pj yet must be recompensed for reductions. 
Firms selling complements seek a lower Pj, as its rise threatens sales. This is 
closely related to what Earl (1983, p. 29) called ‘The Richardson Problem’ which 
Richardson (1959, pp. 233-34) explained thus: 
 
A situation of general profit potential can be tapped by one entrepreneur 
only if similar action is not intended by too many others… In general, a 
producer will need to know both that the production of complements 
(such as raw materials) will be adequate and that the production of 
substitutes will not be in excess. For the sake of brevity, however, we 
shall ignore the existence of complementarity… 
 
Shapiro and Varian (1999, p. 10) give an informational version of the same 
issue:  
 
Traditional rules of competitive strategy focus on competitors, suppliers, 
and customers. In the information economy, companies selling com-
plementary components, or complementors, are equally important. … 
The dependence of information technology on systems means that firms 
must focus not only on their competitors but also on their collaborators. 
…The need for collaboration, and the multitude of cooperative 
arrangements, has never been greater than in the area of infotech. 
 
So we define net interdependence by comparing Pj* (from own-profit 
maximization) with Pj (from joint-profit maximization) – as an alternative to 
substitution assumptions stemming from industry groups – where SI is the 
difference between them, such that Pj´ = Pj* + SI. SI operates as a ‘feedback term’ 
expressing net interdependence within group I with respect to j, which captures 
the external profit effects of the setting of price Pj* as either net substitution 
(the orthodox story with SI > 0) or complementarity (SI < 0). SI is a combinatorial 
of individual profit effects, where each si≠j ≡ (Qi≠j/Qj)  (Mi≠j* - Pi≠j*)  
[εij*/(εj*+1)]. SI  si only with all si’s independent, which cannot be assumed in 
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the presence of fully interdependent phenomena. SI is derived from maximizing 
joint profits for firms in group I with respect to Pj, while ij is the cross-
elasticity of Qij with respect to Pj, and j is the own-elasticity of demand for Qj. 
This is a method of grouping not defined or restricted by substitution, or tied to 
a concept of ‘industry’. But why do ‘industries’ not suffice as a general case of 
firms’ interdependence, showing rivalrous substitution in a competitive frame of 
rewards? 
 
The reason is a horizonal one. First, the question about the essential nature of 
social relations is obscured by industry aggregation; Chamberlin opened doors to 
recognizing complementarity, but did not venture through them. Richardson 
(1959, pp. 233-34) came a lot closer, but balked at complementarity (as quoted 
above). It took Kaldor (1972, 1973, 1975), many years later, to claim increasing 
returns suggest the importance of complementarity over substitution in 
economics, even without horizon effects. The point here – regardless of Kaldor’s 
claim – is that horizon effects, with interhorizonal complementarity, act to 
mimic complementarity and increasing returns, even under fully orthodox 
substitution and rising cost. In other words, as horizons lengthen, net inter-
dependence (SI) always shifts in favor of complementarity, away from 
substitution, if horizon effects are contagious. If so, then dSI/dHj* < 0: an 
increase in Hj* yields (through its contagious effects on Hi≠j*) a shift of SI away 
from substitution in favor of complementarity. For any i≠j element of SI, 
namely si≠j ≡ (Qi≠j/Qj)  (Mi≠j* - Pi≠j*)  [εij*/(εj*+1)], an extension of Hj* will 
likely reduce the magnitude of both Qi≠j/Qj > 0 (as a weighting scalar) and (Mi≠j* 
- Pi≠j*) < 0, while increasing own-elasticity εj* < -1 and thus the negative 
magnitude of (εj*+1) < 0, while the cross-elasticity (εij*) is shifted away from 
substitution (εij* > 0) toward complementarity (εij* < 0), such that dεij*/dHj < 0 as 
well. So regardless of the sign of SI (as a combinatorial of si≠j across any group I 
around member j), dSI/dHj* < 0: a mutual lengthening of horizons shifts our 
interdependence away from substitution (SI > 0) in favor of complementarity (SI 
< 0) in our relations (in all economic contexts). If economic connections are 
horizonal in this sense, then Kaldor’s case for complementarity as our most 
general relation – under increasing returns, anyway – is strengthened 
dramatically by introducing horizon effects to the story. 
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In this regard, horizon effects should be seen as shifting organizational entropy 
and cohesion. In a complex society, coordination of goal-seeking activity ought 
to be seen as a key yardstick for individual choice. When net interdependence is 
substitution, rivalry is efficient: that is well-known to economists. When net 
interdependence is complementary, it is cooperation we want and not 
competition, which is doomed to fail in this setting. Any fragmentation of effort 
– in the presence of complementarity – undermines economic efficiency and 
social welfare. Realms of positive feedback (complementarity) can be found in 
both ecology and education, where competition has harmful effects. Indeed, 
there is a case that competition not only is counterproductive in complementary 
settings (which Kaldor believed was the general case), but also that competition 
is keeping our (private and social) horizons short, with learning a 
complementary process. This is an obvious corollary to the efficiency of 
integration under complementarity, which our horizons surely reflect. If longer 
horizons serve as a measure of organization and negative entropy – and so 
evolution as well – then neoclassical economics stands in the way of advance, by 
wrongly extolling competition in every instance as socially optimal. Substitution 
assumptions shall lead us astray in theories wrongly applied to complementary 
settings. 
 
A horizon effect – the extension or retraction of planning horizons – should be 
seen as an ordinal shift in a complex balance of framed projections, where 
resultant time horizons are only a simple scalar responding to internal and 
external forces. Others’ planning horizons have a major effect on one’s own, as 
will environmental stability, information and knowledge, learning activity, 
energy and attention, encouragement, hope, self-confidence and other factors. 
Most of these are ignored in mainstream models of economics, so introducing 
them through horizon effects is an advance in itself. Furthermore, all economic 
systems – in their efficiency, equity, ethics, ecological health, and 
organizational evolution – are driven by social planning horizons: this 
strengthens the claim for complementarity into a general case, making 
cooperation – not competition – our means to social advance (Jennings 2011). 
 
There is an ordinal measure of entropy underlying horizon effects, with all 
human-caused ecological losses seen as horizonal. The problem is not just that 
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every decision generates lasting effects, but rather how well we anticipate them 
before acting. If all we do has irreversible impacts spreading outward forever, 
and everyone chooses individually in their pursuit of value, it is solely the 
quality of our decisions – and their organic cohesion – that protects us from 
disappointment (or worse). The role of social horizon effects – as inferred from 
patterns of action – open new ways to assess economics. And even the merest 
glance at current affairs suggests the value of viewing things through a 
horizonal lens, in an increasingly myopic world torn asunder by competition. 
Horizonal theory invites some major revisions in how we do our research, 
showing elementary errors in what we think we know. As Georgescu-Roegen 
(1970, p. 9) has said: ‘the history of every science, including that of economics, 
teaches us that the elementary is the hotbed of the errors that that count most.’ 
 
 
Horizonal economics as an emergent social research program 
 
Two insightful economists have looked to Smith’s seminal work; Kaldor (1972, 
pp. 1240-42) opined that: 
 
…economic theory went wrong … in the middle of the fourth chapter of 
Volume I of The Wealth of Nations … [where] Smith … gets bogged 
down in the question of how values and prices … are determined. … As a 
result, the existence of increasing returns and its consequences for the 
whole framework of economic theory have been completely neglected. 
 
Kenneth Lux, on the other hand – in a book called Adam Smith’s Mistake – 
captures an ethical problem behind the invisible hand in Smith’s (1776, Book I, 
Chapter 2, p. 14) statement that: ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own interest.’ Lux (1990, pp. 87-89) says: 
 
Adam Smith made a mistake. …Adam Smith left out just one little word 
– a word which has made a world of difference. And if this mistake is 
not corrected, then the absence of that word could threaten to unmake a 
world. That word is only. What Adam Smith ought to have said is, ‘It is 
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not only from the benevolence…’; then everything would have been all 
right. 
 
The word ‘only’ appears in a previous sentence on the same point, but here is left 
out, treating self-interest as sufficient (without benevolence) instead of framing 
them both together: ‘Smith’s sanctioning of self-interest without any qualifying 
or restraining force completely eliminated the moral problem in human action.’ 
 
According to these economists, then, increasing returns and ethics should be an 
integral part of economics and not just cast to one side. As Pigou (1927, pp. 193 
and 197) explained: ‘…It is impossible for production anywhere to take place 
under conditions of increasing costs’ so ‘cases of increasing costs … do not occur.’ 
The next year, Pigou (1928, p. 256) reinforced the point, saying ‘supply price 
cannot … increase with increases of output. Hence … only the laws of constant or 
decreasing supply price … are admissible.’ The issue relates to ethics because, 
once increasing returns are embraced as a universal phenomenon, economic 
analysis also shifts from nicely decomposable entities to a systems approach, 
within which ethics become meaningful and important constraints on action. 
Here one can view the planning horizon not only as a measure of organizational 
learning and knowledge, but also as an index of ‘conscience’ in its ethical and 
ecological impact. The finding that – as horizons extend – human relations shift 
toward concurrence says that personal growth encourages sensitivity, greater 
maturity, generosity and a broader range of awareness, so better integration of 
plans. Such is why horizons serve us so well as a negative index of entropy in the 
organizational sense. 
 
What we have shown thus far is how our planning horizons interact, and the 
effects thereof in terms of pricing and economic development. There is much to 
be done, however, to open knowledge of how our (individual and social) 
planning horizons react to various stimuli, and how to observe horizon effects in 
the patterns of daily life. Clearly the longer our planning horizons, the lower 
will be our ‘time preference’ or ‘impatience,’ so we expect declining discount rates 
from any horizonal lengthening (Jennings 2012, pp. 16-17). The composition of 
capital ought to shift to more extensive plans, while levels of ethical and 
ecological literacy should rise. Significant changes should be observable in 
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response to horizonal theory, even from merely emphasizing horizon effects in 
our thinking. For regulation of the economy, endless ways in which our rules 
shorten planning horizons should be addressed and opened to question: there are 
so many avenues of research emerging from this approach that their enunciation 
extends beyond the scope of this paper. The point is simply to indicate a few 
directions of thought. 
 
The most fundamental limits in neoclassical theory are substitution and 
decreasing returns suppositions, safely in the hard core of this so-well-
established paradigm. Kaldor rejected this standard approach, endorsing 
complementarity as an offshoot of increasing returns; interhorizonal 
complementarity yields similar findings. Static equilibrium models – severed 
from ‘external’ linkages – simply yield their refined deductions on the basis of 
fixed horizons. Such short-term analyses are restricted to myopic concerns, 
steering attention away from broadly inclusive frameworks and theories. Indeed, 
the effects of competition on education and ecology – as examples of 
complementarity – yield dramatic confirmation of the argument here: that 
competition in complementary settings is not only inefficient but also is destined 
to fail, to become mired in counterproductive fallacies and myopic conundra. 
Indeed, the narrowness of academic inquiry and the ubiquity of ecological losses 
are cases in point: these short horizons are the result of models unfit to their 
realms of use. 
 
Such problems are responsible for organizational stress, showing up in 
symptoms of higher-order human need deprivation in Maslow’s (1954, 1968) 
sense of that term. For example, interhorizonal complementarity means that 
treating grownups like children will bring immature responses. In such settings 
many adults exhibit pathological signs of ‘frustration, failure, short time 
perspective and conflict.’ These symptoms of human need deprivation will lead 
to organizational fragmentation through ‘competition, rivalry, … hostility and … 
a focus toward the parts rather than the whole’ (Argyris 1960, pp. 262-63, 268-
69). When a wrong model is used to design an institutional incentive structure, 
we should expect to find pathological symptoms of organizational stress. Such 
symptoms seem familiar; they infuse social relations. All this suggests that 
dominant traits of our economic culture result from organizational stress 
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stemming from improper institutions, showing express psychological symptoms 
of ill health including conflict, competition, materialism, myopia and 
disruption of effort (McGregor 1960, pp. 310-11). The role of horizon effects 
shall open doors to significant insights on our economic behavior. 
 
Horizon effects, in their response to organizational stress, serve as a meaningful 
measure of entropy, which opens to a ‘horizonal’ economics still largely 
unmapped. Too much orthodox theory abstracts away from horizon effects, 
supposing time perspective fixed: a way to consider planning horizons is as an 
index of ‘run length’ or ‘move horizons’ in chess (Jennings 2009). Our planning 
horizons shift in response to internal and external forces: the potential fruits for 
research in this realm might teach us all a great deal. 
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971, p. 192) introduced economists to the entropy 
concept as a measure of energy usage and ‘sorting’ activity: ‘a living organism … 
continuously sorts. It is by this peculiar activity that living matter maintains its 
own level of entropy.’ But Kenneth Boulding (1962), a few years earlier, 
ventured some questions on organization and the use of an index thereof. Later, 
Boulding (1966, pp. 22-23) proposed a unit of measure for knowledge as the ‘wit,’ 
which seems so apt to horizonal theory. As Boulding put it:  
 
The question of what is economics can be almost as troublesome as what 
is knowledge? … One longs, indeed, for a unit of knowledge, which 
might perhaps be called a ‘wit,’ analogous to the ‘bit’ as used in 
information theory; but up to now at any rate no such practical unit has 
emerged. … The bit, however, abstracts completely from the content of 
either information or knowledge… [and] for the purposes of the social 
system theorist we need a measure which takes account of significance… 
Up to now we seem to have no way of doing this… 
 
The notion of planning horizons – and of their adjustment through ‘horizon 
effects’ – serves as a way to think about entropy in its social and organizational 
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aspects such as Boulding endorsed. The nature of horizonal lengthening 
corresponds so closely with these views that it can be used to assess how well our 
organizations are doing in the pursuit of human ends, which are – ultimately, as 
Georgescu-Roegen (1967, p. 97; 1971, p. 18) notes – the enjoyment of life. 
 
But to adopt this novel approach shall force economists out of an Age of Denial 
over increasing returns, and to forsake ‘The Hicksian Getaway,’ just as Hicks 
(1939b, pp. 82-85; 1977, pp. v-vii) did forty years ago (Jennings 2008a). In 
Chicago, orthodox theory is doctrine and is taught as such (Reder 1981; also cf. 
Leontief 1982). But substitution has no relevance to information network 
economies which are mostly complementary – as shown by their reversal of the 
relation of value to scarcity – nor to academic institutions or ecological settings. 
Standard theory in economics stands on assumptions so unfit to emerging 
complementarities that the recent rise of heterodoxy is symptomatic of vital 
lacunae in the orthodox story. Yet there is still little heed taken by ecological 
economics to the way our interdependence is framed in mainstream models, or in 
efficiency failures of competition in network contexts such as appear in ecology 
or education. Kaldor’s claim that complementarity is the rule in orthodox 
settings says cooperation is efficient without horizon effects. But cooperation is 
surely our route to longer planning horizons, so will foster a healthier economic 
climate in every regard. In this sense, broader planning horizons serve as an 
ordinal index of knowledge, organization and entropic coordination. 
 
As such, horizonal theory yields some more optimistic conclusions than are 
proffered by orthodox standards. If this approach is correct, then competition is 
not as smooth a solution to social organization as so many economists think: 
competition, in keeping horizons short, is sabotaging efficiency in a way 
invisible through a neoclassical lens. Selective focus in theory – as an artifact of 
our rational limits – is also restrictively blind to what is ignored as 
unimportant. Treating H* as fixed deprives us of any understanding thereof. 
The only protection we have from amaurosis is an open mind and a use of 
multiple models, where each sheds light on all others. The sad fact that 
pluralism is so rare in academics is simply another effect of competition where 
it does not apply: these pathologies so abound that we don’t see them as symptoms 
of failure. As some wise soul once said, ‘Fish discover water last’ (McGregor 
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1960, p. 317). Myopic concerns surround us; they threaten our very lives in both 
their cultural and ecological impact. 
 
Perhaps Boulding, Simon and Kaldor ought to have the last word on the scope 
of revision needed. At the end of Boulding’s (1966, pp. 33-36) Ely Lecture on 
knowledge, he issued this scathing critique: 
 
The whole economics profession … is an example of … monumental 
misallocation of intellectual resources… We are still, like Newton, only 
a boy playing on the seashore, and the great ocean of Truth still lies all 
undiscovered before us. That undiscovered ocean is Man himself. What 
we discover about him, I hope, will be for his healing. 
 
Simon’s (1983, p. 107) essay on ‘Reason in Human Affairs’ ended thus, with 
horizons and social advance: 
 
It would be quite enough to keep open for our descendants as wide a 
range of alternatives as our ancestors left for us… Success depends on 
our ability to broaden human horizons so that people will take into 
account … a wider range of consequences. It all depends on whether all 
of us come to recognize that our fate is bound up with the fate of the 
whole world, that there is no enlightened or even viable self-interest 
that does not look to our living in a harmonious way with our total 
environment. 
 
Kaldor (1972, p. 1240) remarked that there is only one way to emerge from 
myopia here: ‘without a major act of demolition – without destroying the basic 
conceptual framework [of orthodox equilibrium theory] – it is impossible to 
make any real progress.’ As Boulding (1966, p. 36) closed his previous statement: 
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